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The 2004 Elections in Northern Ghana 
 




The December 2004 elections in Ghana were held under the terms of the 1992 Fourth 
Republic Constitution, with parliamentary and presidential polls being conducted on 
the same day – Tuesday December 7th.  They were held in the context of continuing 
economic hardship for most of the population, with an estimate of almost a third of 
the population being below the poverty line.  Although the hyper-inflationary 
experiences of the recent past have now been replaced, the rate of annual inflation 
remains approximately 25% and there is a slower but on-going devaluation of the cedi 
against major world currencies.  In 2003 it depreciated by 28.5% against the euro, but 
in the first two months of 2004 it actually appreciated by 2.3%.  It has been estimated 
that in 2003 the economy grew by 5.2%, up from 4.4% in 2002, with increases in both 
the world price for and production levels of cocoa being particularly beneficial 
(Industry Canada, 2004). 
 
This article will present some of the historical and constitutional background to the 
2004 presidential and parliamentary elections in Ghana.  It will then focus on the 
question of why, despite the resources at its disposal and its overall success in the rest 
of the country, the ruling New Patriotic Party failed to make significant gains in the 
north of the country.  It will argue that the explanation for this lies partly in historical 
disputes within the area, combined with more recent socio-economic developments 
and experiences in north – south relations. 
 
 For Ghana as a whole the election results represented a triumph for the ruling New 
Patriotic Party (NPP), with President Kuffuor receiving 52.45% of the vote as against 
only 44.64% for his nearest rival Professor Atta Mills.   However, for the three 
northern regions their continued support for the opposition National Democratic 
Congress (NDC) and the much smaller People’s National Convention (PNC) 
confirmed their continuing divergence from political trends in most of the south. 
 
As Ayee has put it, “Ghana is one of the few countries in Africa that has had 
significant experiences with democratic political life (Ayee, 1998, p.35).  It had a 
functioning multi-party democratic system during the pre-independence self-rule and 
the early independence periods between 1951 and 1960, and again between periods of 
military rule democracy was re-established from October 1969 to January 1972 and 
September 1979 to December 1981.  In November 1992 the military dominated 
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) held multi-party presidential elections 
to return the country to civil rule, but perceived electoral abuses led four opposition 
parties to challenge the outcome and boycott the parliamentary elections of December 
that year.  As a result, it was not until the 1996 elections in which opposition parties 
contested both the presidential and parliamentary contests that democracy with the 
aura of legitimacy returned to Ghana. 
 
It has generally been accepted that the 1996 elections were ‘free’ in that an 
independent Electoral Commission compiled a new electoral register “.. with the 
active collaboration and participation of the political parties” (Ayee, p.61), ensured 
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that all voters had an identity card with either a photograph or a thumbprint, provided 
transparent ballot boxes and cardboard screens for voting, and arranged for votes to be 
counted at each individual polling station.  There was a massive campaign of voter 
education and various groups of international observers were on hand to lend 
“credibility and legitimacy” to the outcome.  Party agents were allowed to be present 
at every polling station and they were required to sign reporting forms endorsing the 
results. 
 
This does not, however, mean that the elections were entirely fair, with allegations of 
bribes being paid to voters in many constituencies, the use of threats and intimidation, 
claims of fake identification cards and so on.  However, most of these claims referred 
to only a small number of constituencies.  Of greater significance is the argument that 
free and fair elections require equality in access to financial resources, and this gives a 
great advantage to the incumbents.  In the 1996 election President Rawlings was able 
to use a Ghana Air Force helicopter to reach inaccessible areas and his NDC had a 
fleet of new campaign vehicles (Ayee, p.71).  This led opposition figures to claim that 
while the 1992 experience was ‘the stolen verdict’, the 1996 one was ‘the bought 
election’. 
 
In 2000, however, the same electoral regulations and essentially the same conditions 
existed but Kuffuor and the opposition NPP were able to win both the presidential and 
parliamentary elections.  Although the NPP was allegedly obtaining finance from 
senior figures in the Nigerian government, had a well-organised network of fund-
raisers amongst the Ghanaian diaspora in Europe and North America, and was 
generally supported by the richer areas of the country, it was still essentially the poor 
relation of the NDC.  This does provide support for the impartiality of the work of the 
Electoral Commission throughout the period, and suggests that financial resources 
alone are insufficient to ensure electoral success in contemporary Ghana. 
 
In 2004 the electoral regulations and political conditions were essentially the same as 
they had been in 1996 and 2000 with the single exception of NPP rather than NDC 
incumbency.  Now it was the NPP which had access to greater sources of finance and 
had the privileges of government which had formerly belonged to the NDC.  Despite 
the on-going economic hardships, the scene seemed set for an overwhelming NPP 
success, consolidating its support in the Akan heartlands of the centre, south and west 
of the country, and moving in to the NDC strongholds of the Volta Region in the east, 
and the Upper West, Upper East and Northern Regions of the north. 
 
The NPP were able to make significant gains in the Fante areas of the Central Region, 
despite this being the home of the NDC presidential candidate Atta-Mills (see figure 1 
for the ethnic map of Ghana).  However, the pockets of NDC resistance in other areas 
of the south remained largely intact.  In the Volta Region they captured just one seat 
(as against a previous zero), in the Upper West one (again compared with zero), in the 
Upper East two (compared with one plus a by-election gain and an Independent who 
crossed the floor) and in the Northern Region eight (as against three in 2000, plus two 
by-election gains and an Independent who crossed the floor).  Even these marginal 
improvements in the three northern regions were not as pronounced as they might 
seem, because the number of seats available had increased by six since 2000 (Upper 
West 8 to 10, Upper East 12 to 13, Northern 23 to 26) .  The seats won by the NPP 
were Wa East (Upper West Region), Navrongo and Builsa North (Upper East 
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Region), and Yendi, Gushiegu, Saboba, Wulensi, Nalerigu, Salaga, Damongo, and 
Chereponi (Northern Region – see figure 2, the Constituency Map of Northern Ghana 
for the 2004 Elections).  Moreover, in several of these seats the NPP majority was less 
than a thousand votes (Damongo, Wulensi, Chereponi and Builsa North). 
 
In the North the election day passed peacefully for the most part, although there were 
actual and attempted physical attacks on electoral officials in three constituencies in 
the Northern Region by supporters of the NPP who were frustrated at their inability to 
persuade the officials to falsify the votes (Zabzugu/Tatale, Tolon and Kpandai).  Prior 
to election  day there was sporadic violence in Bawku where the long-standing 
chieftaincy dispute between the numerically-dominant Kusasi and the previously 
dominant Mamprusi was exacerbated by local resentment against the erstwhile NPP 
MP Hawa Yakubu, primarily for being unwilling to step aside for a younger 
candidate.  Her house was attacked and robbed in her absence, her security guard shot 
and wounded on election day, and there were a number of disturbances at polling 
booths.  In Tamale and neighbouring areas of Dagbon there were various incidents 
before and after the election with allegedly four or five deaths, the poisoning of one 
party’s supporters by contaminated water at the party rally, and a number of shooting 
incidents.  Perhaps the most significant event was the death of Alhaji Mobila, a 
leading supporter of the Convention Peoples Party, in military custody.  Initial reports 
suggest that he was beaten to death, having been handed over to the military by the 
police earlier in the day. 
 
So why did the NPP fail to capitalise in the North on the relatively massive resources 
at its disposal?  Any observer could see the greater number of vehicles at the party’s 
disposal and the massive campaigning effort being mounted.  The Vice President, 
Aliu Mahama, himself a northerner from the Yendi area, toured the regions and held 
many rallies.  Promises were made for road improvements and the development of 
other social amenities.  Apparently strong candidates with significant power bases 
were chosen – several District Chief Executives, who had enjoyed the opportunity to 
develop local patronage over the previous four years, stood, as did people appointed 
by the President to be junior ministers in the out-going government.  Yet the result 
essentially showed no significant advancement for the NPP in the north as a whole.  
 
Northern Ghanaian politics cannot be explained in terms of a single mono-causal 
factor, as traditional disputes, inter-ethnic rivalries, ideological traditions, electoral 
self-interest, the growth of new interest groups, and the personal appeal of particular 
candidates or their close supporters all played a role.  In the past the few ‘local 
notables’, whether traditional chiefs or educated/rich individuals, could mobilise the 
support of particular villages or sections, but now in every locality there are 
competing ‘notables’ as education and elements of a more ‘modern’ economy and 
society have spread.  This is supported by an examination of the lists of candidates 
and their educational qualifications.  In the Northern region, for example, most 
constituencies were contested by at least one graduate, with Tamale Central having as 
its candidates two with PhDs, one M.Phil, one B.A. and one 4-year Cert A teacher.  In 
the three regions combined there were ten candidates with PhDs, and numerous others 
with post-graduate qualifications, first degrees and diplomas.  So the North now 
provides a highly competitive arena, with well-educated candidates using modern 
campaign resources in a context where traditional rivalries vie with ‘modern’ 
demands and aspirations for political significance. 
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To understand the overall failure of the NPP in the area, we need to break the North 
down into more meaningful units.  In some the key factor remains the continuation of 
traditional conflicts.  This was most clearly the case in the kingdom of Dagbon in the 
Northern Region.  Here the dispute over the paramountcy between the Andani and 
Abudulai families has been on-going since the middle of the nineteenth century and 
the death of Ya Na Yakubu (see Staniland, M, 1975).  In March 2002 the paramount 
chief from the Andani family (Ya Na Yakubu Andani II), together with thirty 
supporters, was murdered in the Dagbon capital of Yendi and his body dismembered.  
The NPP regime has contained several leading Dagomba, all from the Abudulai 
family or with close links with it (Vice President, Minister of the Interior, Northern 
Regional Minister, Yendi District Chief Executive, National Security Adviser, 
Member of National Security Council).  The failure of the regime to bring any of the 
culprits to justice angered not only the Andani family, but other less-partisan 
individuals who saw the government as failing to act on the deep problems of 
Dagomba society.  The scale of turn-out for NDC rallies in Tamale in November and 
December was indicative of the intensity of feelings, and the result throughout the 
mainly Dagomba constituencies was that the NDC won nine of the eleven, with only 
the Abudulai-dominated Yendi and Gushiegu returning NPP candidates.  It must be 
realised, however, that the paramountcy is only the pinnacle of Dagbon society and 
that chieftaincy disputes occur at other levels – and it is the competition for 
chieftaincy in general that is the key motivating factor.  This probably explains why 
Prince Imoro Andani from the Andani family stood as a candidate for the NPP in 
Kumbungu – his father had been an unsuccessful candidate for the Savelugu 
chieftaincy, and so this failure alienated him from the Andani mainstream; his hopes 
of succession to a higher traditional office in Dagbon lie with an Abudulai 
paramountcy overturning Andani chieftaincy appointments.  Personal chieftaincy 
concerns might also explain the alleged support of the Karaga Na for the NPP, even 
though he is from the Andani family – this position would place him as an ideal 
reconciliation candidate for the paramountcy under an NPP government.  This move 
was not, however, supported by other members of his household , and the Karaga 
constituency voted almost 2 to 1 for the NDC presidential and parliamentary 
candidates (Ghana Government, 2005). 
 
Bawku in the Upper East region is another area where traditional disputes remain 
strong.  Under the British the Chief of Bawku was drawn from the minority Mamprusi 
tribe, but since Independence successive regimes have been drawn into supporting 
and enskinning rival candidates from the Kusasi and Mamprusi.  In the 2000 election 
violence again characterised the election with the deaths of more than 50 people 
(Ayee, 2001, P.7).  It was alleged that the NDC ‘played the ethnic card ‘, claiming 
that an NPP government would revert the chieftaincy to the Mamprussi (Aye, 2001).  
In practice most of the Mamprusi vote seems to have gone to the NPP candidate in 
Bawku Central in the hope that a new NPP regime would indeed overturn the ruling 
that had led to a Kusasi ( Azoka II) being enskinned as Bawku Naba.  In the event the 
settlement preserved the place of the Bawku Naba, leading to Mamprusi disaffection 
and one of their number standing as an Independent candidate in 2004.  This reflected 
the grievance of many Mamprusi that under the Kusasi chief they were losing 
previous privileges such as their claims to land usage.  The vote the Mamprusi 
candidate achieved in 2004 was almost exactly equal to the margin by which the 
sitting NPP candidate was defeated (8574 as against 8349).  As indicated above, 
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however, it is not a question of this traditional ethnic dispute being fought out in 
isolation, but rather it is a significant issue vying for importance with other issues.  In 
the wider Kusasi area this was shown by the victory in Zebilla of John Ndebugre over 
the incumbent NDC candidate Cletus Avoka.  Prior to the election there was 
considerable pressure within their respective parties in both Zebilla (NDC) and 
Bawku Central (NPP) for the sitting candidates to step down to give younger or other 
candidates scope for their ambitions; so resentful failed candidates and their 
supporters added their opposition to incumbents in the contest.   
 
Wa in the Upper West Region had the potential for a traditional dispute to have a 
profound impact on the election, but in practice this did not turn out to be the case.  In 
Wa Central there has been a political vacuum in the traditional arena with the inability 
of competing factions to agree on a new Paramount Chief – the Wa Na, and through 
lack of occupancy the chief’s palace is showing signs of disintegration.  The NDC has 
been associated with the candidature of Seidu Yakubu from the Nakpasa Gate which 
has been excluded from the paramountcy for a considerable time (see Wilks, 1989 and 
Dougah, 1966).  This presented the opportunity for the NPP Government to capitalise 
on the situation by opposing Seidu Yakubu and thereby gaining support from the 
other three gates to the paramountcy.    The NPP government, however, has not done 
this, preferring to stand aloof from the dispute, which so far remains unresolved. 
 
The general point still stands, though, that a significant factor in the failure of the NPP 
in the North in the 2004 elections was its inability or unwillingness to settle or deal 
with traditional disputes in ways which would have enhanced its support. 
 
Very different factors applied in much of the Upper West region.  This was the part of 
the North that had gained most from the years of PNDC and then NDC rule.  Firstly, 
the Upper West Region was created in 1983 by the PNDC with its capital at Wa.  This 
led to the creation of more administrative jobs in Wa, and was followed by significant 
improvements to the economic infrastructure.  Roads in particular were vastly 
improved, with the major link to the South via Bamboi being tarred in stages.  In 2000 
the region solidly maintained its support for the NDC, with only Sissala constituency 
instead supporting the PNC which has its roots in the PNP regime of 1979 (which had 
Dr Hila Limann a Sissala from the Tumu area (Gwollu) as its presidential candidate).  
Popular opinion was that the new NPP regime from 2000 had done little to continue 
with the region’s development; indeed the road-building programme had been paused.  
Only one area had seen significant benefit – the establishment of a new district in 
Funsi – and it was no great surprise when it was that area (Wa East constituency) 
which was the only one to return an NPP candidate in 2004 (even here the majority 
was less than 2000 votes).    In an area without deep traditional disputes (Wa town 
itself is an exception to this) modern aspirations for development become more 
significant, and gratitude to the NDC and resentment against the NPP won out in 
2004.  It will be interesting to scrutinize whether the NPP regime operates the ‘carrot’ 
or ‘stick’ towards the Upper West and what the subsequent outcome will be in the 
2008 elections. 
 
These two extreme patterns – traditionally dominant issues in Dagbon and the 
Kusasi/Mamprusi areas - and the demand for modern developments in the Upper 
West – are displayed in more mixed combinations elsewhere in the North.  Traditional 
tribal disputes between the formerly dominant tribes – such as the Dagomba, 
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Mamprusi and Gonja – and the ‘subservient’ tribes such as the Kusasi, Konkomba, 
and Lobi – still remain of potential significance as was shown by the wars of 1994 
when the Konkomba and Nawuri clashed with the Dagomba, Nanumba and Gonja 
and in which there were officially 2000 deaths, 178,000 displaced persons, and over 
300 villages destroyed (Lentz and Nugent, 2000, p.185).  However, their electoral 
significance has been diminished by the creation of new constituency boundaries that 
virtually ensure the subservient groups representation in parliament - Sawla (Lobi), 
Chereponi (Chakosi), Bunkpurugu (B’moba), Saboba, Zabzugu/Tatali, and Kpandai 
(Konkomba).  In the Kassena-Nankani area around Navrongo and Paga, village 
rivalries remain of significance as they did in the 1950s as revealed by Dennis 
Austin’s classic study (Austin, 1961).  Although the Kassena and Nankani belong to 
different language groups, there is no evidence of pre-colonial tribal unity of either 
group, and there is much inter-marriage and cross-identity between them.  While there 
can be the mobilisation of some support for say a Nankani candidate in the largely 
Kassena Chiana-Paga constituency, rivalry is more commonly felt between villages 
and sections of villages rather than ‘tribes’, with each feeling it is their time to have 
an MP or that their ‘favourite son’ should be the candidate.  In 2004 Nayagnia section 
in Navrongo, for example, overwhelmingly voted for a local man who was the PNC 
candidate against those of the two major parties. 
 
The 2004 election certainly showed for at least this campaign, government patronage 
was insufficient to make major gains.  District Chief Executives (party nominees), 
Regional and Junior Ministerships provided alternative sources of development and 
influence for the NPP to make electoral inroads but success was limited.  The 
Government managed to hold onto its recruited formerly Independent MP and 
appointed junior minister in Salaga but lost in the same circumstances in Garu-
Tempane, and its junior ministerial candidates in Bolgatanga and Lawra only 
managed third place and a distant second respectively.  The creation of a new district 
in Wa East helped the NPP to win there but it failed to make any impact by the same 
policy in Talensi in the Upper East.  Individual personalities showed that they rather 
than government resources could have an impact in some places, with the 
Independent J.Y.Labik winning in Bunkpurugu, and David Apasera and John 
Ndebugre winning for the small PNC in Bolgatanga and Zebilla respectively. 
 
Ideology is one variable that is difficult to assess in its influence, given that the 
manifestos and policies of the two main parties are not very different.  Every party 
now also claims to carry the mantle of Kwame Nkrumah, even though the NPP is 
clearly seen by most Ghanaians as the direct descendant of Danquah’s United Gold 
Coast Convention and Busia’s Progress Party.  However, its recruitment of 
Convention Peoples Party and PNC politicians into the government after 2000 in an 
attempt to isolate the NDC from other opposition groups has given some limited 
credibility to their ‘Nkrumahist’ claim.  In the North the PNC most directly claimed 
the Nkrumah legacy, with the CPP having very little influence outside some pockets 
in Dagbon and neighbouring areas (the CPP came second in Mion and Saboba 
constituencies in 2000).  In 2004 the CPP parliamentary candidate in Mion managed 
to attract over 4,500 votes but this meant only a distant third place (the NDC and NPP 
candidates each gained over 10,000 votes), and there was not even a CPP candidate in 
Saboba.  Some individuals and families do keep the ideological traditions alive – the 
Tedam family in Paga and the Karbo family in Lawra have maintained strong support 
for the Danquah/Busia tradition whatever the regime of the day.   
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In general, ideological differences remain limited in their overt expression in the 
North.  Socially, however, the ideological divide remains of some significance even if 
in actual policies it does not seem to.  The NPP is seen as the party of the intellectual 
and business elite and the chiefs in the South, while the NDC has inherited much of 
the support of marginal elites of lower professionals and urban workers.  As the 
inheritor of the radical years of the PNDC, the NDC carries the support of the new 
groups brought into active politics in the 1980s when the previous political elite was 
at least temporarily eclipsed.   There is also a long-standing in-built reluctance of 
many Northerners from some of the poorest and most deprived areas of the country to 
support the NPP with its perceived base in the wealthy Ashanti Region, with some 
former migrants to the South having memories of discrimination and prejudice against 
them.  The NPP’s apparent policy of selecting highly educated candidates did not 
always facilitate the development of an easy relationship with ‘ordinary’ people; in 
Bolgatanga, for example, Dr Agambila, a highly articulate appointed junior minister 
in the out-going government could only come a distant third to the more populistic 
NDC and PNC candidates. 
 
It is interesting though that the conscious attempt by the NPP to recruit support from 
the Konkomba along the Togo border, who are amongst the poorest and least 
educated people of the North, has led to electoral success, with victories in Wulensi 
and Saboba.  This is balanced by the success of the NDC in obtaining and now 
retaining considerable support from the formerly dominant Nanumba chiefs in the 
area.  The message here is that local groups have successfully manipulated political 
parties to represent their interests, even when these appear to go against the parties’ 
own ideology, apparent social affiliations and traditions. 
 
Some new patterns of cleavage are emerging in the North.  The rural/urban division is 
not new, with the NDC rural vote remaining particularly strong in 2000 while in 
Navrongo town the NPP seems to have done particularly well.  The towns in the 
North, however, seem to be becoming ‘anti-government’, voting against the NDC in 
2000 and against the NPP in 2004 – Bolgatanga, Bawku, and to some extent Tamale 
being the obvious examples.  There is also some evidence of the youth and women’s 
votes becoming significant.  The latter could partly account for the success of the 
NDC candidate in Lambussie and the NPP candidate in Builsa North who had both 
nurtured contacts with women’s groups.  Lentz has suggested that in relation to the 
Upper West, youth and development groups now have a significant voice in political 
leadership, with chiefs having “…to come to terms with (these) new actors should 
they wish protect their influence” (Lentz, 2002, p.270) and similar comments have 
been voiced with reference to the Kassena-Nankani and Kusasi areas.  Certainly 
several candidates stated to me their greater concern with obtaining support from the 
youth and women than with getting the chiefs on board. 
 
Finally there is the issue of ‘northern-ness’.  Under British rule the Northern 
Territories were kept administratively distinct from the Gold Coast and Ashanti.  
There was a refusal to invest  in economic infrastructure, with Governor Clifford 
going so far as to recommend the virtual abandonment of the north to concentrate 
development  on the “… high potential areas of the Colony and Ashanti” (Wraith, 
1967).  The educational system was consciously limited to provide education for the 
sons of chiefs and to provide sufficient educated manpower to run the local 
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administration (see Bening, 1990).  The result was that at the time of party politics the 
few educated northerners feared domination by new ‘black’ colonisers.   With this in 
mind, in the 1950s the North had its own Northern Peoples Party which fought against 
Nkrumah’s CPP until regional parties were banned by the government in 1970.  
Educated Northerners still retain some legacy of these fears, as shown by a speech in 
September 2001 by northern-born and educated Vice President Aliu Mahama, calling 
for the holding of an ‘All Northern Peoples Development Conference’ to help combat 
the deprivation of the north and its inability to meet basic needs (Northern Advocate, 
October 2001)   In 2000 and 2004 the North has again asserted its difference from the 
main body of the South (excluding the Volta region) by voting primarily for the NDC 
in all three of its constituent regions.  However, this should not be seen as an 
expression of a common ‘northern-ness’ resenting southern control.  Indeed it is the 
PNC which could most clearly claim a ‘northern’ identity, being the successor to 
former President Limann’s PNP, with the NDC being associated in some people’s 
minds with Jerry Rawlings and the Volta Region rather than the North.  The PNC’s 
success in taking Zebilla and Sissala West and holding onto Bolgatanga and Sissala 
East was combined with respectable votes in the Mamprusi constituencies of the 
Northern Region.  However, its vote in other northern areas was often derisory, and so 
the influence of the northern factor in the election was very limited (in Yapei the PNC 
presidential candidate attracted only 61 votes).  Indeed, the success in the Sissala seats 
can be largely explained in terms of the Limann factor, in Bolgatanga and Zebilla by 
the strength of the two individual candidates, and in the Mamprusi area by the fact 
that the party’s presidential candidate, Dr Edward Mahama, hailed from there.  So 
‘northern-ness’, even if it remains significant in the hearts of many educated 
Northerners, can largely be excluded as an independent factor from its effect on the 
2004 election – traditional and modern disputes, ideological and social factors and the 
qualities of particular candidates were more significant.  The failure of Dr Mahama 
and the PNC in the north and the NDC in the south would suggest that the best hope 
for the North to produce a successful a presidential candidate in 2008 would be for a 
northerner to succeed President Kuffuor as the NPP candidate.  It would then be a real 
test of the significance of feelings of common ‘northern-ness’ to see if such a 
candidature could over-ride the traditional, social and political grievances that have 
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